The first part of this series appeared on July 29.
Benefits of De-Identified Patient Data
For decades, de-identified patient data has been used to support clinical research.
As mentioned previously, the VA intends to extract de-identified patient data from its EHR to improve our understanding of care processes for cancer and PTSD. The research might show that certain treatment plans are more effective in certain patient subpopulations like the elderly or females, or that some approaches are more cost-effective than others.
Similarly, scientists in fields such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease and oncology use de-identified patient data on a regular basis to conduct trials of drugs and medical devices.
Post-marketing research also relies on such data. This is how scientists discovered that Vioxx posed an increased cardiovascular risk. De-identified patient data will undoubtedly be used to assess the safety of the Swine Flu vaccine once it becomes available, and comparative effectiveness research of the sort contemplated by the Obama administration will rely heavily on de-identified patient data as well.
Risks of De-Identified Patient Data
Jay Cline, a prominent expert on patient privacy recently conducted an exhaustive multi-data base review of the matter and was unable to turn up even one case in which a de-identified patient data set had been breached and re-identified with criminal intent.
Why? Cline hypothesizes that for those who seek to profit from the theft of private information, de-identified patient data is far less valuable than say, credit card information. “It's harder to monetize the fact that I know Judy Smith of Peoria has heart disease -- by filing false claims in her name, for example -- than to have Judy's credit card number and expiration date,” he says.
“If I'm a criminal with advanced data skills and I have a day to spend, I'm going to go after financial data and not health data.”
To be sure, there have been cases in which White Hat hackers have succeeded in re-identifying patient data, including Carnegie Mellon computer scientist LaTanya Sweeney’s famously successful effort to identify then Massachusetts governor William Weld’s health information by combing a $20 list of demographic information she obtained off the Internet with a de-identified set of health-insurance information…and that’s what has privacy advocates worried.
What Should HHS Do?
Despite these concerns, HHS should not to wield too heavy a sword in deciding whether to overturn current HITECH legislation, which does not require that patients be notified when their de-identified data is breached.
Continue reading "A Measured Approach to De-Identified Patient Data" »